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Introduction 
 
It is generally recognized that, notwithstanding their distinct histories and individual 
enforcement agencies, competition law and intellectual property law are not just compatible 
instruments of economic policy; they are complementary instruments. The two bodies of law 
pursue the common goal of economic efficiency. This does not preclude a certain tension 
between them. To understand why, it is useful to briefly recall the more specific objectives of 
each body of law.  
The contemporary economist views competition policy as “the set of policies and laws 
which ensure that competition in the marketplace is not restricted in a way as to reduce 
economic welfare” (Motta, 2004, p. 30). This perception of the role of competition policy has 
not always been paramount in Europe. Integration towards a single market used to be a central 
objective of competition policy. Although the aforementioned present-day view of the role of 
competition policy has been in ascendancy at the Community level and in Member States 
after creation of the single market, European competition authorities still hold the view that 
national intellectual property rights hold back economic integration. 
According to Landes and Posner (2003, p. 1) intellectual property consists of “ideas, 
inventions, discoveries, symbols, images, expressive works, … or in short any potentially 
valuable human product (broadly, “information”) that has an existence separable from a 
unique physical embodiment, whether or not the product has actually been “propertized”, that 
is brought under a legal regime of property rights”. Therefore, intellectual property laws 
represent the set of statutes, institutions and policies that grant, for a limited time, to authors 
and inventors exclusive rights over the expression of their writings and intellectual creations 
(copyrights) or over the ideas themselves embodied in their technical inventions (patents).  
To what extent is the existence of such exclusive rights compatible with competition? 
In this regard it is key to note an important difference between the European Union and the 
                                                 
1 We thank Roger Clark and Eleanor Morgan for their insightful comments on a previous version (December 
2004).   
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United States (Korah, 2001). Unlike the US, the EU grants no intellectual property rights 
other than trademarks. Patents and copyrights are granted under the law of Member States, 
complemented by the so-called European patent, created by the European Patent Convention 
(1973)2 currently signed by 28 contracting states. According to Articles 2 and 3, a European 
patent granted by virtue of this Convention and covering one or more of the contracting states 
shall have the effect of and be subject to the same conditions as a national patent granted by a 
contracting state. Therefore, a European patent is just a bundle of national patents granted by 
the European Patent Office (EPO). The EPO provides a one-stop shop that makes it possible 
to get around the transaction costs associated with having examinations carried out in 
individual states. A patent granted by the EPO is recognized in a Member State if translated 
into the national language. A proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Patent 
(O.J. 2000/C337 E/278) relying on the EPO, that would establish a single patent for the whole 
European Union, has not been adopted. Although cases are litigated before national courts, 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has given Community authorities a powerful instrument 
when it “drew a distinction between the grant or existence of a national intellectual property 
right, which was not subject to the Treaty, and its exercise, which was … The Court took 
power to override member states with respect to intellectual property rights that threatened to 
divide the common market along national boundaries” (Korah, 2001, 805).  
Initially, the European Community had an inimical perception of property rights. They 
were considered as impediments for the achievement of the common market. “The ECJ used 
the distinction between the existence and exercise of property rights in the early 1970s to 
develop a judicial doctrine of the Community exhaustion of intellectual property rights: once 
a protected product has been put on the market by the holder … or with it’s consent in one 
member state, the right was exhausted and a parallel intellectual property right could not be 
used to restrain the commercial importation of the product to another member state” (Korah, 
2001, 805). 
Things began to change in the 1980s (Encaoua et al. 2003, Martinez and Guellec, 
2003). The major role of intellectual property rights in stimulating innovation and growth 
gained greater recognition. New governing bodies have emerged, for example the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and the 
                                                 
2 Available at www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/  
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Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in the US.3 Moreover patent legislation has 
entered a harmonization process across countries via bilateral and multilateral treaties.4  
From a competition policy perspective it also matters that over the same period there 
have been important changes in the motives that drive firms to obtain patents. A number of 
studies point to the fact that firms increasingly file applications covering technologies that are 
neither developed nor licensed.  In some high-tech industries, firms seek patents for strategic 
purposes, specifically to exclude potential rivals (Carlton and Gertner, 2002, Cohen, Nelson 
and Walsh, 2000, Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). For example the US semiconductor industry 
builds patent fences around core inventions. One observes a proliferation of mutually 
blocking patents that coalesce into patent thickets that exclude potential rivals. This comes in 
addition to implicit threats of infringement suits that serve as bargaining chips to obtain 
access to other firms’ technologies or to force others to accept cross licensing arrangements 
(Shapiro, 2001, Encaoua and Hollander, 2002). 
These practices raise a host of issues at the interface of IP and competition policy5. 
More specifically they may require a fresh exploration of areas where the grant of exclusive 
rights may shackle competitive market processes. Two forms of competition should be 
considered: product competition and research competition. Product competition yields 
allocative efficiency and gives consumers the opportunity to obtain products at prices that are 
close to costs. Research competition produces new products and new technologies. It allows 
firms to escape the constraints of product competition, especially in closely competitive 
industries where firms have access to the same technologies and produce under the same costs 
(Aghion et al. 1997, 2001, Encaoua and Ulph, 2000).    
However, market incentives may be insufficient to produce the optimal amount of 
innovation. The standard modelling of competition under a competitive process does not 
account for important specificities. Not only the outcome of R&D is uncertain as everyone 
recognizes, but, more importantly, its output is an information good, i.e. it is non rivalrous and 
non excludable, except by legal means. Granting the original inventor an exclusive right 
appears as an ex ante incentive to innovate, inasmuch as it encourages investment in research 
by avoiding free-riding. Note that it is the ex ante incentive that matters for the purpose of 
                                                 
3 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has nationwide jurisdiction and hears specialized cases like patent 
and international trade cases. See www.fedcir.gov 
4 The agreement on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which has over 140 members, 
goes beyond the requirement that protection applies to foreign inventors as to domestic ones by also specifying a 
minimum set of rights that each member state must provide (see Scotchmer, 2004, chapter 11 “Innovation in the 
Global Economy”, 320)  
5 For an overview of the tensions at the interface of IP and competition policy, see Federal Trade Commission 
(2003) 
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investment rather than the ex post reward to an inventor. The ex post reward approach that is 
prevalent among lawyers, would lead to the conclusion that since the investment cost is 
already sunk, the exercise of the exclusive right has to be strictly scrutinized under the 
competition law. The ex ante approach leads to the inverse conclusion that the successful 
investor shall not be deprived from exclusive right to commercialise or sell invention in order 
to keep the ex ante incentive to invest.     
Thus the grant of an exclusive right that limits competition in the product market is 
part and parcel of a trade-off. “Alike ordinary property rights that promote competition in 
production by preventing competition in consumption, intellectual property rights are a way 
(but not the only one) to promote innovation, by restricting some kinds of competition in 
production” (Vickers, 2001). Even so, later competition is encouraged because a patent is 
granted on condition of disclosure of the knowledge that underpins the invention. The 
disclosure favours the diffusion of know-how, allowing others to build around or improve on 
earlier inventions (Encaoua and Ulph, 2000). Protecting an innovation under secrecy does not 
allow such diffusion. The dissemination of knowledge also benefits from licensing 
agreements and other arrangements such as the pooling of patents6. The latter also improve 
static efficiency because innovators are not always the best equipped to exploit existing know-
how.  
Today many economists and legal scholars “acknowledge that analysis and evaluation 
of intellectual property law are appropriately conducted within an economic framework that 
seeks to align that law with the dictates of economic efficiency … Cases, doctrines and 
principles have to be examined from the standpoint of whether they are efficient in an 
economic sense and, if not, how they might be changed to make them efficient” (Landes and 
Posner 2003, p. 4). 
Still, as soon as one trades in the bliss of pronouncing on fundamental objectives for 
the mundane pleasures of understanding the consequences of specific rules, it becomes plain 
that there exist areas of stress between the two bodies of law. The following sections show 
how European courts have managed these stresses in three areas: (1) Parallel imports and 
market segmentation; (2) Refusals to supply essential inputs protected by patents and 
copyrights; (3) Forms of conduct by copyright collectives.  
 
1. Parallel imports and competition 
                                                 
6 A patent pool is an agreement under which the owners of different technologies license them as a 
bundle. See Merges (1999), Carlson (1999), Lerner and Tirole (2002), Lerner et al. (2003), Scotchmer (2004, 
175-180)  
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Firms segment markets for efficiency reasons and in support of collusive agreements. They do 
so to gain a capacity to discriminate in terms of prices or qualities. Because intellectual 
property rights enhance right holders’ ability to segment markets, courts are constantly 
required to balance a desire to protect the holders of patents, copyrights and trademarks with a 
desire to give consumers access to products at competitive prices. From an economic 
perspective, the issue is not merely one of trading off dynamic and static efficiency. In 
addition, the issue is how, in specific cases, segmentation affects static welfare. 
With respect to international segmentation, there are specific issues related to 
exhaustion regimes7 and the legal treatment of parallel trade. Parallel trade takes place when 
products put into circulation in one country are exported to another country via distribution 
systems not set up, or consented to by the party who put them on the market first. Parallel 
trade - also called grey trade - is not the same as trade in counterfeited goods8. Products that 
circulate in parallel trade are genuine. They are generally marketed first by a person who 
holds the IPRs in these products, or by a licensee of such person. What sets parallel trade 
apart from ordinary commerce is the diversion of products from the markets ostensibly 
targeted by IPR holders. 
Parallel trade responds to cross-country price disparities.9 It limits the capacity of 
firms to segment national markets. This means that from an economic perspective, restrictions 
on parallel trade should be looked as devices that facilitate territorial segmentation.  
In the following, we start by recalling the incentives firms have to segment markets. 
Then we consider the view of the European institutions on the barriers to parallel trade; first 
imports from outside the Union, then trade among Member States.  
 
1.1. Market segmentation 
 
A firm with market power can increase profits by segmenting markets and engaging in 
geographic price discrimination. However, there is no unambiguous answer to the question 
how this will affect overall welfare. Price discrimination brings about a welfare reducing 
misallocation of output across markets but total output may be larger than under uniform 
pricing - possibly because additional markets are being served. The latter is welfare 
                                                 
7 As detailed below, "exhaustion regimes" refer to how intellectual property rights are weakened by the trade of 
protected goods and services. 
8 "Grey trade" means that the products are neither black, i.e. counterfeited, nor white since they are sold against 
the will of at least one IPR holder. 
9 The price gaps may be due to differences in demand elasticity or to divergent pricing by regulators across 
countries, as is the case of pharmaceuticals.  
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increasing.10 Malueg and Schwartz (1994) have shown that when there is a large disparity in 
the willingness to pay across national markets, a mixed regime of discrimination across 
groups of countries differentiated from each other by substantial differences in willingness to 
pay but not among countries within individual groups yields greater world welfare than 
uniform pricing on a global scale.11   
A capacity to discriminate may be necessary to insure that profits are positive. This 
applies mainly to industries where fixed costs are very large compared to variable cost. One 
thinks of industries that rely heavily on R&D or other creative effort. The argument 
essentially boils down to the claim that in certain industries, a mere right to exclude conferred 
by intellectual property law does not insure that returns are sufficient to elicit a socially 
optimal level of innovation.  
In this regard it is important to stress that economic theory does not give an 
unequivocal answer to the question whether a switch from uniform to discriminatory pricing 
increases industry profits when firms confront rival producers. While it is true that each firm 
benefits from acquiring a capacity to discriminate, it loses when rival producers obtain the 
same capacity. The net effect on profits depends on the intensity of the rivalry. Allowing 
discrimination intensifies competition in market segments where buyers view the products of 
different producers as good substitutes, but, at the same time, it allows firms to capture larger 
profits in market segments that have a strong preference for their particular variety.12  
It is not always the desire to discriminate that steers firms towards market 
segmentation. Manufacturers may grant distributors exclusive territories to encourage them to 
invest in promotional activities such as presale information, product advertising and quality 
control. In the absence of exclusivity, the investment by one distributor benefits rival 
distributors. Distributors that do not invest could attract customers who have already sought 
information from distributors who do invest, by undercutting them. The very fact that their 
costs are lower gives them the option. The result is that each distributor has less incentive to 
invest than is optimal from the manufacturer’s perspective. To address this problem the 
manufacturer can take measures that reduce the likelihood that buyers in a territory allocated 
to one distributor would be served by distributors in another territory.   
                                                 
10 When additional markets are being served, consumers in these countries will benefit and consumers in 
countries that would have been served under uniform prices need not lose. 
11 Adoption of such policies would, however, run afoul of importers’ most favoured nation obligation under 
WTO rules. WTO membership does limit a country’s freedom to choose its policy with respect to parallel trade. 
However, it requires the country to abide by the most favoured nation rule regardless of the policy it chooses.  
12 The relevant literature is reviewed in Stole (2004). See also Encaoua and Hollander (2004).  
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While the alignment of distributors’ and manufacturers’ incentives is likely to be 
welfare enhancing, it could come at a cost. For example, the elimination of downstream 
competition can lead to double marginalization.13 This reduces manufacturers’ profits and 
consumers' welfare. It also reduces interbrand competition. Rey and Stiglitz (1995) have 
shown that the latter is due to the fact that distributors with market power do not fully pass on 
to their buyers increases in the wholesale price. Therefore the demand faced by manufacturers 
is less elastic than it would be if distributors were in competition. The outcome of the 
reduction in elasticity can mirror collusion14.  
Manufacturers adopt a variety of measures to curtail grey trade and enhance their 
capacity to profit from price discrimination. They sometimes put quotas on the quantities 
delivered in a national territory.15 At other times they limit the coverage of guarantees to the 
territory where the product was first put into circulation. Every so often, they use technical 
means that preclude use in one country of an article originally sold in another territory.16 At 
times, they try to create in the mind of consumers residing in high price countries, the belief 
that grey goods are counterfeit, pirated or of lesser quality.17   
The laws that protect intellectual property provide another avenue for the 
segmentation of national markets. A central issue concerning intellectual property protection 
is which rights are relinquished upon the first legal sale of a product in which rights are 
initially held. Consider for example the case of CDs containing music. Composers, publishers 
and, possibly, makers and performers hold initial rights in the music as well as in the CD that 
contains the music. However, upon first sale of the CD they lose the right to prohibit its 
                                                 
13 That is both the manufacturer and the distributor set price above marginal cost. 
14 Gallini and Hollis (1999) give a detailed overview of the pros and cons of market segmentation, focussing on 
the restrictions on parallel imports achieved via trademark protection.  
15 See Crampes, Hollander and Macdissi (2004). 
16 For example, the international distribution of films on DVD has been technologically and legally segmented 
into geographical markets. The regional coding system requires that all DVD players be manufactured for 
distribution and use in one of six geographic regions around the world. It is a global initiative by agents of the 
film and DVD industries aimed at preventing the free movement of licensed copies of copyright DVDs around 
the world. Dunt, Gans, and King (2001) have studied whether the restrictions on DVD usage across regions can 
be justified as a means of generating potentially socially desirable price discrimination for content providers or 
are simply a means of restricting competition. They conclude that "the conditions that may theoretically allow 
such restrictions to be efficient are unlikely to hold in the case of DVDs and that social welfare is likely to be 
significantly enhanced by eliminating such technical restrictions." (page 1) Their argument is that among the 
four potential consequences of such restrictions on regional flows (price discrimination, collusion, free-riding, 
and the prevention of consumer confusion), the latter two -potentially socially desirable- consequences are 
unlikely to be important.  
17 However, in some instances a moderate amount of parallel imports may actually benefit a manufacturer. See 
Anderson and Ginsburgh (1999). 
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resale. That right has been exhausted.18 In the discussion below, exhaustion of a right will 
always refer to the loss of the right to control reselling.    
IPRs are territorial. The right to control a particular use of protected material applies 
only within the national boundaries of the jurisdiction that grants that right. This applies 
equally to the exhaustion of rights i.e the national law determines under what circumstances a 
right holder – resident or foreigner – exhausts the right to control resale in the national 
territory.  
There are several exhaustion regimes. Under a regime of national exhaustion, the 
person holding IPR on a product waives the right to prohibit resale of that product in the 
national territory upon the first legal sale within the boundaries of that territory.19 In countries 
that accept international exhaustion, the original right holder forfeits the power to control 
resale within national boundaries as soon as the product is legally put into circulation 
anywhere in the world.  
The particular regime a country chooses may vary from one type of IPR to another. 
For example, a country may adopt international exhaustion in the case of trademarks and 
national exhaustion for patents. Furthermore, regimes may occasionally be product-specific. 
The exhaustion regime a country chooses always reflects a somewhat uneasy balance 
between, on one hand, a desire to protect the interest of IPR holders, and on the other hand, 
the wish to guarantee consumers and businesses the opportunity to make informed purchases 
in a competitive environment. 
In the following, we discuss the approach of the European Union towards parallel 
imports from a perspective of competition policy. The EU makes a distinction between 
parallel trade between Member States and trade between the Union and non-members. The 
most important difference between the EU and other jurisdictions is the adoption of a regime 
of regional exhaustion under the Trade Marks Harmonization Directive.20 Article 7 of the 
Directive prescribes a regime under which the owner of a trademark cannot avail himself of 
                                                 
18 Some of these right-holders can still prohibit certain uses of the CD. For example, they can forbid the CD 
performance on radio or in any public place. The reason is that the right to perform in public the music fixed on 
the CD is not exhausted upon the first sale of the CD. 
19 This assumes that the goods have not been altered after they have been put on the market by the owner of the 
trade mark or with his consent. Repackaging is not per se forbidden; see Commission Communication on 
parallel imports of proprietary medicinal products – frequently asked questions, MEMO/04/7, Brussels, 19th 
January 2004. 
20 The Directive was adopted in 1989 (89/104 (EEC) 21 December 1988) but became effective only in 1996. “A 
trade mark may consist of any sign capable of being represented graphically, particularly words, including 
personal names, designs, letters, numerals, the shape of goods or of their packaging, provided that such signs are 
capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings.” (article 2). 
The objective of a trade mark is to help buyers to identify the source of products. This gives producers the 
incentive to improve quality. 
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the right conferred by trademark law to prevent the sale anywhere in the EU of a good 
marketed first by him or with his consent in any territory of the European Economic Area. 
This, however, ceases to apply when the proprietor of the trademark has legitimate reasons to 
oppose further commercialization, especially when the condition of the goods is changed or 
impaired after they have been put on the market. Trade mark rights in Member countries are 
not exhausted by first circulation of the product outside the EEA.21 
 
1.2. Grey goods originating outside the EEA  
 
The conditions under which exhaustion of right conferred by trade marks occurs have been 
clarified in several decisions rendered by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In the 
Silhouette case, the ECJ ruled that a Member State could not adopt a wider exhaustion regime 
than set out in Article 7 of the Trade Mark Directive. This was founded in part on the wording 
of the Directive, and on the observation that “if some members practiced international 
exhaustion and others did not there would be barriers to trade, and this would affect the 
functioning of the internal market, and this is precisely the objective pursued by the 
Directive”.22  
The notion of consent received elucidation in the Sebago judgment in which the ECJ 
rejected the validity of an importer’s claim that the trademark holder exhausted his right to 
prevent the sale within the EU of all batches of a good once he had consented to the 
marketing of a single batch of identical goods.23   
The meaning of consent was also at the heart of the later Davidoff and Levis cases (C-
414/99 to C-416/99). The ECJ held that consent cannot be inferred from the absence of 
contractual provisions or communication to that effect, or from the fact that the goods carry 
                                                 
21 Before the Directive went into effect, most EU countries operated under international exhaustion. A concise 
review of the history of the Directive appears in Trogh (2002). Although the exhaustion regime is mainly applied 
to trademarks, it also concerns the topography of semiconductors (article 5(5) of Directive 87/54/EEC), patents 
(art. 28 of Agreement 89/695/EEC), biological inventions (article 10 of Directive 98/44/EC) and designs (article 
15 of Directive 98/71/EC). The European Court of Justice applied the principle to copyrights (Cases 55/80 and 
57/80 Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH and KKK-Tel International v. GEMA ) and to patents (Case 15/74 
Centrafarm v. Sterling Drugs). Our focus here is on the competition issues raised by the protection afforded by 
trade marks. 
22 Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs, paragraph 41 cited by Trogh (2002). The case involved the attempt by 
the Austrian owner of the Silhouette trademark to prohibit the importation into Austria of a type of genuine 
Silhouette sunglasses legally marketed in Bulgaria but no longer sold in Austria. Prior to accession to the EU 
Austria operated under a regime of international exhaustion. Having failed in its action for trademark 
infringement before the lower courts, Silhouette appealed to the Supreme Court of Austria which submitted a 
reference to the European Court of Justice. The ECJ, therefore, overturned the decision in the Austrian courts. 
23 The case involved a suit brought by the owner of the Sebago trademark against a Belgian firm that imported 
shoes from the Salvadorian manufacturer of the genuine product for resale under the original label. The claimant 
argued that the importer had infringed his trademarks because he had not received consent to market the shoes in 
the EU. 
 9
no warning that sale outside a specific area is prohibited. The ECJ held that consent requires 
an unequivocal demonstration of renunciation of one’s right to oppose importation into the 
EEA.  
While the aforementioned decisions bear on the question whether trade mark law can 
be used for blocking parallel imports into the Union, they do not address the question whether 
contractual provisions between private undertakings that commit one party to sell only in 
assigned territories outside the EU are prohibited. This question was addressed by the ECJ in 
response to a question raised by a French court. The case involved proceedings brought by 
Yves St Laurent Parfums (YSLP) against Javico. The perfume manufacturer had entered into 
a contract for the distribution of its products in selected territories outside the EEA. The 
contract provided that the distributor would not sell the product outside these territories or to 
unauthorized dealers in the territory. When YSLP discovered that products sold to Javico 
were marketed in several countries of the Community, it broke the contract and started legal 
proceedings. When a French court upheld both termination of the contract and its claim for 
compensation, the defendant appealed on the ground that the controversial contractual 
provision was prohibited by Article 85(1) (now 81(1)) and therefore automatically void.  
The ECJ ruled that in order to determine whether agreements such as the one 
concluded between YSLP and Javico run afoul of Article 85(1), one must consider whether 
their purpose or effect is to restrict to “an appreciable extent competition within the common 
market and whether the ban may affect trade between Member States”.24 The Court held that 
agreements could not be struck down unless they were capable of affecting trade between 
Member States. The ruling it handed down was that the provisions at issue “did not constitute 
agreements which, by their very nature, are prohibited by Article 85(1)” (paragraph 21 of the 
judgment). It remained for the national court to determine whether they did in fact have such 
effect.25  
The significance of the Javico ruling may be rather limited in view of the ECJ’s 
decision in Davidoff and Levis. A possible consequence of the latter is that firms concerned 
about the importation of their trademarked products into the EU will find such prohibitions as 
                                                 
24 Case C-306/96, Javico International and Javoco AG v. Yves Saint Laurent Parfums SA, 28 April 1998. 
25  The Court said that a violation may take place “where the Community market in the products in question is 
characterized by an oligopolistic structure or by an appreciable difference between the prices charged for the 
contractual product within the Community and those charged outside the Community  and where, in view of the 
production and sales in the Member States, the prohibition entails a risk that it might have an appreciable effect 
on the pattern of trade between Member States such as to undermine attainment of the objectives of the common 
market” (paragraph 28 of the judgement).  
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imposed on Javico redundant.26 This would be true all the more if it was determined that 
international exhaustion applies in circumstances where contractual measures designed to 
prevent importation into the EU contravene Article 81 or Article 82.  
 
1.3. Partitioning of the EU into national markets 
 
The stance of competition authorities with respect to territorial restrictions that restrain grey 
trade within the Community appears less flexible. The courts have held that an agreement 
whose object it is to prevent grey trade within the Community is by its very nature a violation 
of Article 81(1).27 This means that in order to find a breach of Article 81(1) it is sufficient to 
show: i) that the measures taken amount to an agreement; and ii) that the object of the 
agreement is to prevent parallel trade within the Community. The following decisions 
illustrate the point.  
Yamaha28 sold instruments through a network of official dealers located in various EU 
countries. It signed contracts with its dealers that bound the latter to the following: 1) sell 
solely to final customers; 2) buy solely from Yamaha’s national subsidiary; 3) supply solely 
distributors authorized by the national subsidiary, and 4) contact Yamaha Europe in Germany 
before exportation via the Internet.29 In addition, the guarantees issued by Yamaha were in 
effect only in the country of original purchase of the instrument they covered.30 Furthermore, 
the contract between Yamaha and its Icelandic dealer contained an explicit prohibition of 
parallel trade.  
The Commission concluded that commitments to sell exclusively to final consumers, 
buy solely from Yamaha’s national subsidiary and supply solely distributors authorized by the 
national subsidiary had the object of preventing cross-supplies within Yamaha’s dealer 
network.31 It reached this conclusion by examining the possible consequences of the 
aforementioned provisions. The Commission also argued that "although the object of the 
agreement (to contact Yamaha before exporting) may not have been to directly restrict 
                                                 
26 Unless such provisions allowed the owner of the trade mark to claim damages for infringement that would 
otherwise not be awarded. 
27 For example, in Case IV/35.733 – VW, “(t)he obstruction of parallel exports of vehicles by final consumers 
and of cross deliveries within the dealer network hampers the objective of the creation of the common market, a 
principle of the Treaty, and is already for that reason to be classified as a particularly serious infringement.” 
28 Commission Decision of 16.07.2003, Case COMP/37.975 PO/Yamaha. 
29 The details of the contractual provision differed to some extent from one country to another but their essence 
was very similar. 
30 The contracts also contained provisions that restricted the dealers’ pricing policies. 
31 It also noted that under settled case law there is no need for the purpose of application of Article 81(1), to 
show an actual anti-competitive effect of agreed conduct whose object it is to restrict competition within the 
Common Market. 
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exports, it clearly had the potential effect of discouraging dealers from exporting products to 
other Member States." (Paragraph 109 of the decision). Interestingly, the Commission did not 
even broach the question of object or effect in regard to the Icelandic contract. It simply 
invoked the ruling without considering Yamaha’s claim that, given Iceland’s remote location, 
it was unlikely that the contractual clause would in fact restrict trade.32  
The question which kind of conduct is required to create an agreement within the 
meaning of Article 81 was at the heart of the subsequent Bayer case. The local distributors of 
the pharmaceutical firm had signed contracts that included provisions that were designed to 
eliminate grey trade among Member States. The European Commission held that there existed 
an agreement between Bayer and its dealers and fined Bayer33 (96/478/EC). Its finding was 
based on the observation that the dealers had continued their business relationship with Bayer, 
and, in response to the contract, had adapted the way they placed orders. The Commission 
noted but did not discuss the implications of the fact that in response to Bayer’s measures the 
wholesalers put together their orders as if the product they received would serve to meet only 
the demand of their national market, and that they did their best to inflate the national quotas 
imposed on them by Bayer. The evidence examined by the Commission also showed that 
wholesalers tried to get additional quantities by ordering from other, generally smaller, 
wholesalers who were not monitored by Bayer.  
The Court of First Instance (CFI) overturned the Commission’s decision. (2001/C 
95/13). It held that the Commission had erred by considering that it had established the 
existence of a concurrence of wills between Bayer and the dealers. And, the mere absence of 
such concurrence meant that there was no agreement within the meaning of Article 81(1).34 
The CFI argued that the Commission was wrong in concluding that the reduction in orders 
could only be understood by Bayer as a sign that dealers had accepted its demands. The 
Commission could not maintain that the reason wholesalers had to order additional quantities 
from other dealers was because they agreed to Bayer’s demands. The CFI opined that these 
orders were not indicative that wholesalers did acquiesce.35 It also explained why Bayer’s 
                                                 
32 The Javico ruling mentioned in section 1.2 states that “an agreement which requires a reseller not to resell 
products outside the contractual territory has as its object the exclusion of parallel imports within the Community 
and consequently restriction of competition in the common market ... Such provisions, in contracts for the 
distribution of products within the Community, therefore constitute by their very nature a restriction of 
competition." C-306/96, paragraph 14. 
33 Article 3 of the decision imposed a fine of ECU 3 million and Article 4 fixed a penalty of ECU 1000 for each 
day’s delay in informing the wholesalers that exports are allowed within the community and are not penalized. 
34 Remind that establishing the existence of a potentially anticompetitive agreement relieves the Commission of 
the obligation to show an effective or probable lessening of competition as a result of the agreement.  
35 This begs the question whether some forms of cheating on a mundane price-fixing cartel could similarly 
protect a participant from being accused of tacit collusion.    
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behavior justified a decision at variance with the earlier Sandoz ruling in which it had 
determined that an agreement existed.36 Sandoz had on repeated occasions indicated on the 
bills sent to its clients that export of the goods was prohibited. The fact that its distributors 
had continued to order without protest and had de facto respected the ban meant that they had 
tacitly acquiesced to Sandoz’ terms. However, whereas Sandoz had put a specific 
anticompetitive clause in the contract, a formal prohibition to export was lacking in Bayer. 
Furthermore, Bayer had not implemented a systematic monitoring of the final destination of 
the product and there was no evidence that the manufacturer had threatened or punished a 
wholesaler who exported, or made the delivery of product conditional on wholesalers’ 
compliance with the alleged export ban.  
The ECJ upheld the CFI's judgment. (C-2/01 P and C-3/01 P delivered on 6 January 
2004). It indicated that while existence of a monitoring system and penalties may amount to 
an indicator of an agreement, they do not prove its existence. The Court emphasized that the 
mere fact that Bayer imposed a quota that may have had the same effect as an export ban, 
does not imply it had imposed a ban, or that there existed an agreement. The Court stressed 
that the concurrent existence of an agreement that is neutral from a competition standpoint 
and a measure restrictive of competition that is imposed unilaterally does not amount to a 
violation of Article 81(1). Because there had been no claim that Bayer was dominant, the need 
to examine whether Article 82 had been violated did not arise. 
The decision in Bayer does not fully answer the question whether unilateral behavior 
by a dominant actor designed to rein in parallel trade would be treated by competition 
authorities in the same way as other potentially abusive forms of conduct.37 The answer to this 
question ultimately depends on how competition authorities and the courts view 
discriminatory practices, in particular price discrimination. It appears that exemptions to the 
prohibition of price-discrimination by competition authorities are rare.38 This is somewhat 
surprising in view of the fact that there is no basis in theory for a claim that discrimination is 
                                                 
36 Sandoz Prodotti Farmaceutici/Commission ( C-277/87, rec. P.I-45) 
37 After all, restrictions of parallel trade go against a fundamental objective of the Treaty of Rome which is 
integration of national markets. 
38 On August 2001, the Commission cleared certain provisions of the Visa international payment card system, in 
particular the so-called "no-discrimination rule", which prohibits merchants from charging customers a fee for 
paying with a Visa card, or offering discounts for cash payments. The Commission had originally objected to 
this rule, which means that the Commission was not against discrimination. The EC changed its opinion in the 
light of the results of market surveys carried out in Sweden and in the Netherlands, where the no-discrimination 
rule was abolished following the intervention of national competition authorities. See the statistical studies at 
europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/29373/studies/sweden/report.pdf and 
europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/29373/studies/netherlands/report.pdf. 
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more harmful to the competitive process than the other forms of conduct mentioned in Article 
82. 
As indicated at the beginning of the section, the economic literature points to several 
circumstances under which price discrimination yields higher welfare than uniform pricing. 
Even from a consumer welfare point of view one cannot argue that discrimination always 
lacks redeeming value. Furthermore, the empirical evidence on the price effects of parallel 
trade within the European Union remains sparse. Some analysis suggests that the rents 
captured by parallel traders exceed the benefits to consumers in countries that import via 
parallel channels and consumer gains are small or moderate.39 This and the fact that parallel 
trade consumes resources would suggest that grey products may affect welfare adversely or 
not at all. One must admit, however, that at this stage it is not clear whether the assumptions 
underlying the conclusion that consumers in the EU draw little benefit from parallel trade, are 
critical to that finding.40 
 
2. Refusals to supply an essential intellectual property right  
 
Rights of exclusion differ according to the category of IP. A patent owner can prevent others 
from making, using or selling the patented invention for a period of 20 years from the issue of 
the patent. Copyright protection which applies to original works of authorship embodied in a 
tangible medium of expression normally expires in the European Union 70 years after the 
death of the author. Unlike a patent, a copyright protects only the form of expression. It does 
not protect the underlying idea. This means that a right holder in a work “a” holds no rights in 
an independently created work “b” based on a similar idea. Trade secrecy protection applies 
to information whose commercial value depends on non disclosure. Of course, trade secrets 
have no expiry date and they do not provide a legal barrier that stops others from 
independently producing and using the same invention. 
From an intellectual property perspective, one’s right to exclude others is key. 
Competition authorities do recognize the right to exclude since it is granted under patent and 
                                                 
39 See Ganslandt and Maskus (1999) and NERA (1999). 
40 Nevertheless European Competition authorities seem to take a particularly dim view of restrictions designed to 
prevent arbitrage. In the words of the Director General of DG Competition at the Commission "… sales 
restrictions may be used to prevent arbitrage and support price discrimination between different markets. This 
will in general lead to a loss of consumer welfare. While some consumers will pay a higher price and others will 
pay a lower price, collectively consumers will have to pay more to finance the extra profits obtained by the 
supplier and to cover the extra costs of supporting the price discrimination scheme. Therefore consumer welfare 
will in general decline unless it can be clearly shown that otherwise the lower priced market(s) would not be 
served at all and that therefore the price discrimination will lead to an undisputable increase of output. It's only in 
the latter case that consumer welfare may actually increase." See Lowe (2003). 
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copyright laws. Their concern arises when that right protects an input that is indispensable to 
another party. They may consider that a refusal to licence an essential input is abusive when it 
prevents competition. This creates a potential for friction between intellectual property law 
and competition law.  
According to the essential facilities doctrine a firm holding a dominant position in the 
provision of an input that is indispensable for the production of another good that competes 
with the good in which the firm is dominant, acts abusively when, without objective 
justification, it refuses to supply the input under fair conditions. The application of this 
doctrine must obey to stringent conditions: i) the facility must be under the control of  a 
dominant firm; ii) the access to the facility is unavoidable to allow a competitor operate in a 
downward market; iii) it is practically impossible to duplicate the facility; iv) the access to the 
facility by competitors is technically feasible under standard safety rules; v) the plaintiff is 
willing to accept the standard commercial terms and vi) the refusal to supply access to the 
facility has no objective reason.41  
The application of this doctrine is much more difficult when the so called essential 
input is an intangible asset. In principle, firms that produce patented or copyrighted 
information goods and wield substantial monopoly power are not shielded from antitrust 
liability. However, it is only in exceptional circumstances that courts in the EU and the US, 
have invoked the doctrine.  This raises the difficult question of whether licensing should be 
made compulsory in some circumstances.  
 
2.1 The economics of compulsory licensing 
 
Gilbert and Shapiro (1996) argue that conditions such as the ones listed above cannot 
by themselves justify compulsory licensing on economic grounds: “These conditions do not 
characterize the circumstances under which compulsory access to a facility or to intellectual 
property would be beneficial to economic welfare. A firm may choose to deny access to an 
actual or potential competitor … for many different reasons. These include reasons that are 
likely to enhance economic efficiency”. Preventing free riding that would diminish incentives 
for investment and innovation, preserving a desired level of service quality and designing 
appropriate contracts that compensate the intellectual property owner for the loss of revenue 
that may result from access may justify the refusal to deal. Still one cannot dismiss a pure 
strategic motive behind a refusal to license. Therefore, a detailed inquiry on a case by case 
                                                 
41  A useful introduction to the essential facility doctrine can be found in Temple Lang (2000). Different 
illustrations related to the transport sector under EC competition rulings are given in Motta (2004, note 53, ch.2).    
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basis is needed to analyze the consequences of a refusal to license an essential intellectual 
property right. The inquiry must take into account the economic conditions under which 
welfare would be diminished if access to the facility was denied (Katz and Shapiro, 1985, 
Gilbert, 2000, 2002, 2004, Scotchmer, 2004, Maurer and Scotchmer, 2004).  
On economic grounds, the short run effects of a refusal to license depend on how the 
price of the license is determined. Under a fixed fee regime, if the competitor had access to 
the IPR, its decisions would not be affected by the value of the fee. The fixed-fee license does 
not change the market outcome and its effect is purely distributive. But even in this case, the 
effect on welfare of an order to license depends on the licensee’s efficiency. If the licensee is 
not very efficient or at least less efficient than the patent’s holder when using its proprietary 
technology, an order to license is detrimental to economic welfare. However, there are also 
situations where licenses to efficient competitors could be optimal but are not voluntary. It is 
in these situations that compulsory licensing is welfare improving in the short run.  
Under a regime with royalties linear on units supplied, the outcome may depend on 
whether the patent holder does produce or not himself. If the patent holder does not produce, 
linear royalties combined to fixed fees are sufficient to support the maximum profit 
(Scotchmer, 2004, 187-189). In this case licensing is based on private incentives and there 
may be no scope for compulsory licensing. But when the patent holder is also a producer, the 
situation is different since a linear royalty leads to an inefficient outcome, except if the 
licensee is more efficient than the patent holder. One solution to this problem could be either 
to impose a royalty rate that is a decreasing function of the licensor’s output or to cap the 
licensor’s output by imposing a maximal bound (Maurer and Scotchmer, 2004).     
Since the proponents of compulsory licensing only require that the royalty be 
reasonable and do not propose a certain payment formula, it is difficult to assess the short run 
consequences of a compulsory license for economic efficiency.  
An obligation to license also affects long run incentives to invest in R&D. Consider 
the case where investment in R&D is represented by a bid for an innovation produced by an 
upstream laboratory. Gilbert and Shapiro (1996) identify two adverse effects of compulsory 
licensing. “First, a compulsory license reduces the profits of the winning bidder by forcing the 
winner to license in situations where it is not privately rational to do so. Second, compulsory 
licensing is likely to lower the value of the winning bid because it increases the profits of the 
losing bidder. Under compulsory licensing, the losing bidder is assured that it will benefit 
from the innovation, assuming the owner of the technology is compelled to license the 
technology at a price that the licensee would be willing to pay. The size of the winning bid is 
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determined by a firm’s value of owning the technology, less the value to the firm if the 
technology is in the hands of its rival. Compulsory licensing lowers the first component and 
raises the second. Thus, compulsory licensing can have two negative effects on economic 
welfare. It can reduce welfare in the short run by compelling inefficient licensing. It can also 
reduce welfare in the long run by reducing incentives for innovation.” (p. 12,753) 
 
2.2 Decisions of European courts 
  
To illustrate these difficulties, we discuss a number of competition cases that address 
refusals to license essential inputs protected as intellectual property. Some major decisions 
clarify under what circumstances European competition authorities consider that a right 
holder abuses a position of dominance by refusing to sell or license a protected input to a 
competitor.  
 
 Renault42 and Volvo43 cases.  
  
The facts of the two cases are similar. Renault and Volvo had design rights on their models 
for car body panels. They denied access to their design rights to independent repairers, 
preventing them from supplying spare parts. The ECJ did not set out the circumstances in 
which a refusal to sell is abusive. It did, however, provide examples of abusive conduct, 
pointing out that the latter can result from the exercise of intellectual property rights. They 
include: (a) the arbitrary refusal to supply; (b) fixing prices at an unfair level; (c) ending the 
production of spare parts for models still in circulation. The ECJ ruled that the freedom of an 
IP owner is the core subject matter of the exclusive right and that the refusal in itself could not 
be an abuse of dominant position under Article 82. Refusal to license could be an abuse only 
if there was additional abusive conducts of the types reported above.  So the ECJ did not 
condemn the defendants.   
    
Magill44 
In the Magill decision, the ECJ set out for the first time circumstances a refusal to license can 
be said to constitute an abuse of dominance45. They include (a) preventing the emergence of a 
new product for which there is a potential demand; (b) a non-justified refusal to license; and 
                                                 
42 Case C-53/87, ECR 6039, 1988 
43 Case C-238/87, ECR 6211, 1989 
44 Case T-69/89, ECR II-485, 1991 
45 The presentation of this case is inspired from Korah (2001) and Derclaye (2003).  
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(c) the monopolization by the right’s holder of a secondary market by exploiting power in a 
primary market. 
The facts of Magill are as follows: Three Irish TV broadcasting stations held 
copyrights on their individual program listings. Each station published its own TV guide to 
inform viewers of its program for the following week. Each station also granted a license to 
daily papers to publish its list of programs one day in advance and the license was granted 
free of charge. When Magill decided to publish an all-inclusive weekly guide for all three 
stations, they sued for copyright infringement and got a preliminary injunction. The stations 
subsequently refused to grant licenses to Magill and the company filed a complaint with the 
European Commission. The Commission concluded that refusal was in breach of Article 82. It 
ordered the stations to put an end to their abusive conduct by supplying "third parties on 
request and on a non-discriminatory basis with their individual advance weekly programme 
listings and permitting reproduction of those listings by such parties" (89/205/EEC). 
This decision was upheld on appeal by the CFI and the ECJ. In a famous decision46 the 
highest court said that, although the right to exclude is the substance of the exclusive right, the 
refusal to license in the special circumstances listed above violates the general obligation of 
dominant firms to supply a downstream competitor. The ECJ held that although “mere 
ownership of an intellectual property right cannot confer a dominant position”, there was a de 
facto monopoly over the information produced by the TV stations since they were the only 
source. The refusal to supply a license was preventing the emergence of a new product for 
which there was apparently a market demand; and finally there was no justified reason to the 
refusal. The refusal to license was judged under the heading of the essential facilities doctrine. 
The Court did not address the question whether one’s obligation to license should in some 
ways be affected by the economic value of the asset protected under intellectual property law. 
The social benefit of the right to prohibit publication of a TV guide is hardly obvious. Neither 
the inspiration behind an artistic creation nor the perspiration behind a research effort is 
present: there was no significant sunk cost to justify an IP protection. The economic rationale 
may be that the public wants to be confident that the published programs are reliable. This, 
however, does not explain why the holder should be granted exclusivity, except if there is a 
risk of error in the competitors' publications.  
Much of the litigation to the refusal to license would not take place if intellectual 
property rights were granted on more solid grounds. The proliferation of IPRs, many of 
                                                 
46 Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, 1995, ECR I-743. 
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dubious background, exacerbates problems at the interface of Intellectual Property law and 
competition policy. It would be useful to assign a screening function to the intellectual 
property system by sorting out inventions that would be undertaken without any intellectual 
protection from those that would not. Without such selection, frivolous intellectual property 
rights will most likely proliferate without adding a real social benefit and provoking 
expensive litigation.  
 
Ladbroke47 
The association that organizes horse races in France holds the copyright on the sounds and 
pictures of races. It refused to grant Tiercé Ladbroke - a Belgian bookmaker - a license to 
rebroadcast French horse races live. The Commission rejected a complaint by Ladbroke and 
the CFI rejected an attempt by Ladbroke to invoke Magill. The CFI limited the obligations of 
a dominant actor under Magill by holding that there was no duty to license live rebroadcast of 
French horse races to a firm that was already the leading provider of betting services in 
Belgium. But, it also made explicit the obligation of a producer to provide access to an 
indispensable input. The courts held that there might be a duty to supply where access was 
essential because there were no substitutes.48  
 
Oscar Bronner49    
Although it does not deal directly with intellectual property, the Oscar Bronner case has much 
in common with the previous cases. Mediaprint, an Austrian newspaper publisher and 
distributor, refused to distribute the daily newspaper of Oscar Bronner - a small publisher - 
through its national home-delivery network. Bronner complained to an Austrian court that, as 
a small publisher, it could not invest in another distribution network next to that of Mediaprint 
who was dominating the distribution service. Mediaprint argued that it was not required to 
help a competitor. The Austrian court referred to the ECJ the question whether the refusal by 
a group holding a substantial share of the market in daily newspapers to allow the publisher of 
a competing newspaper access to its home-delivery network constituted an abuse of a 
dominant position. The Court argued that refusal would not constitute an abuse if there were 
alternatives to home delivery or if it was not impossible to develop a competing home 
                                                 
47 Case T-504/93, 1997, ECR II-923 
48 "The refusal to supply the applicant could not fall within the prohibition laid down by Article 86 (now 82) 
unless it concerned a product or service which was either essential for the exercise of the activity in question, in 
that there was no real or potential substitute, or was a new product whose introduction might be prevented, 
despite specific, constant and regular potential demand on the part of consumers "(CFI, Case T-504/93, par. 
131). 
49 Case C-7/97, 1997, ECR II-923 
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delivery system.  Considering that the plaintiff had not shown that it would be uneconomical 
for competitors to set up a second system, the Court ruled that there was no breach.   
The ECJ decision has contributed to a better understanding of the doctrine. “Advocate 
General Jacobs used very general language in narrowing the obligation of a dominant firm to 
grant access. He observed that the ECJ has not used the term “essential facility” in this case 
law, but has held in many cases that for a dominant firm to cut off supplies to an existing 
consumer amounts to an abuse” (Korah, 2001, 815). Most importantly, the Advocate General 
stressed that in assessing the balance between the need to keep incentives to creation of the 
facility and the need to protect competition “particular care is required where the goods or 
services or facilities to which access is demanded represent the fruit of substantial investment. 
That may be true in particular in relation to refusal to license intellectual property rights. Such 
exclusive rights are granted for a limited period that in itself involves a balancing of the 
interests in free competition with that of providing an incentive for research and development 
and for creativity. It is therefore for good reason that the Court has held that the refusal to 
license does not of itself, in the absence of other factors, constitute an abuse”.50  
 
NDC/IMS51 
IMS supplies reports on the regional sales of pharmaceutical products in different countries 
including Germany. In order to respect confidentiality pharmacies are grouped by zones  
called bricks or modules. IMS has created a protected structure of 1860 modules in Germany 
(copyright on a data base). In 1999, National Data Corporation (NDC) and Azyx entered the 
German market by creating a structure that was compatible with that of IMS. IMS sued for 
infringement and won. When IMS refused to issue a license to NDC, the latter filed a 
complaint that this constituted an abuse of dominant position. The Commission compelled 
IMS to grant a license to undertakings already present in the market. However, the order was 
suspended on appeal by the CFI. This suspension was later upheld by the ECJ. The 
Commission has now withdrawn its decision. 
The case contrasts the views of the Commission and those of CFI and ECJ (Derclaye, 
2003). The Commission reasoned as if there had been an implicit adoption of the essential 
facilities doctrine and as if the aforementioned decisions, particularly Magill, imply an 
unambiguous formula. For that reason it simply checked that the conditions listed by the ECJ 
were met. Because it found that IMS had a dominant position in the German market, that its 
                                                 
50 Advocate General Jacob’s opinion in C7/97, 1998 I/7817, §61 
51 Interim Measures: Case COMP D/338.044 OJ L 59/18 (2002), CFI judgement: Case T-184/01, 2001, ECR II-
3193 
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refusal was unjustified, that the refusal eliminated competition and that there was no actual or 
potential substitute to the IMS structure, it made an order to license.  
By contrast the CFI emphasized that the circumstances of Magill were exceptional. It 
argued that the facts in Magill and IMS were different. The judge advocated that "the 
applicant has made out a provisional prima facie case that the Commission has misconstrued 
the scope of the principles set out in Magill" (24 in Case T-184/01 R).  
According to Derclaye (2003), the judgment suggests that there are two interpretations 
of the Magill case: the cumulative and the alternative interpretation. Under the cumulative 
interpretation the Commission failed to apply the first condition set in Magill, namely that the 
refusal to license prevented the appearance of a new product which the IPR holder did not 
offer and for which there was a potential demand. Since such condition was not apparent in 
the IMS case, the CFI suspended the decision of the Commission. Under the alternative 
interpretation, blocking access in order to weaken competition would have been sufficient to 
invoke article 82.  
 
Microsoft52 
After the complaint made by Sun Microsystems (1998) that its rival Microsoft does 
not disclose information on technical interfaces to Windows NT that is necessary to allow 
competition in the market for server operating system, the European Commission expanded 
its investigation in 2002 on how streaming media technology (Media Player) has been 
integrated into Windows.  The European case against Microsoft involves two issues, both 
related to potential abuses of a dominant position, one about the restriction of access to the 
interface between Windows PC and non-Microsoft work group servers and the other one 
related to tying Windows Media player with the dominant Windows operating system. In 
2003, the European Commission announced a preliminary injunctive decision to require 
Microsoft to provide greater technical information to its server competitors and to reduce the 
ties between its operating system and Media Player. After the collapse of the settlement talks 
between the European Commission and Microsoft in 2003, the Commission issued a decision 
(24 March 2004) ruling that the company abused twice its market dominance. As regards 
interoperability, Microsoft was required not later than 4 months after the decision to disclose 
complete and accurate interface information which would allow non-Microsoft work group 
servers to achieve full compatibility with Windows PCs and servers. Moreover, the disclosed 
                                                 
52 Case T-201/04R 
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information had to be updated each time Microsoft brings to the market new versions of its 
products. As regards tying, Microsoft was required in a delay of 3 months to offer to PC 
manufacturers a version of its Windows PC operating system without Media Player. 
According to the Commission, this remedy would allow the bundle configuration to reflect 
what consumers want and not what Microsoft imposes. Finally, Microsoft has been fined 497 
million euros for abusing its market power in the EU.   
Microsoft applied for interim measures, requesting from the CFI a suspension of the 
measure on the grounds that it would make irreparable damages. The CFI dismissed the 
application for interim measures53.  
We focus here on the disclosure order. The technical documentation allowing 
interoperability does not concern the Windows source code, as it is not necessary for the 
development of interoperable products. It concerns only the specifications of the interface 
between the Windows PC operating system and the non-Microsoft work group servers54. 
Whether these specifications are covered or not by IP is a complex and technical issue.  Even 
if it does not rule out the possibility that these specifications may be covered by copyright, the 
Commission maintains that their implementation by others does not constitute a breach of 
copyright since they lead to clearly distinct works (point 168 in the CFI Order). If these 
specifications were protected by patents, the issue would likely be different. What would 
happen if these specifications were protected only by trade secrecy law? The argument of the 
Commission is not completely convincing: “The Commission acknowledges that Directive 
91/25055 does not require the inventor to disclose the information on his own initiative. 
However, from the aspect of any trade secret that Microsoft may have, disclosing 
interoperability information is not comparable to licensing a competitor to copy a work 
protected by intellectual property legislations. That assertion is supported by the technical 
relevance of such disclosure, by the practices existing in the software industry and by 
Microsoft’s own behaviour when it entered the market” (point 183 in the CFI order).   
 At this stage, it is difficult to draw a definite conclusion from the Microsoft case 
except the very general one that the evolution of technology raises new and complex issues at 
the interface of IP and competition law. It could be interesting to develop some guidelines 
clarifying the exceptional circumstances under which access would be mandatory. For 
instance, it could be helpful to state that non access is acceptable except when all the 
                                                 
53 Order of the President of the CFI, 22 December 2004, available at www.europa.eu.int or curia.eu.int. 
54 A group server operating system runs on central network computers that provide services to office workers 
around the world in their day to day work (file sharing, printing, etc.) 
55 Council Directive 91/250/EEC of May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs. 
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following conditions hold:  i) access is indispensable for providing a product on a secondary 
market, ii) there is an objective potential demand for the would-be product and iii) there are 
no objective justifications for the refusal. But even if these conditions are met, other questions 
remain open. For instance what would be the reasonable price for the licensing of the 
disclosed information if access and interoperability were made compulsory?  
To conclude this section, we would like to emphasize that the treatment of refusal to 
license essential intellectual property rights is a very important question in the framework of 
cumulative innovation, particularly in ICT and biotechnology56 The cumulative character of 
successive innovations, in which improvements and applications derive from previous 
inventions, raises concerns that intellectual property rights may create difficulties for follow-
up inventions. But, rather than compelling intellectual property holders to license their right 
when it is essential, another suggested way is to develop bilateral or multilateral agreements 
such as cross-licensing, grant backs, patent pools and collective management of intellectual 
property rights. We turn now to this last issue.  
         
3. Collective management of intellectual property rights 
 
Collective management of rights allows authors to overcome the transaction cost hurdle that 
impedes the individual exercise of rights granted to them under copyright law. Copyright 
collectives - also called collection societies - emerged to manage rights in works that have a 
great number of potential users but where the value of a single work to the individual user is 
small. In such situations, management of rights by individual rights' holders is not 
economically justified. Under individual management, the costs of negotiating with users, 
collecting payments, identifying those who infringe and suing them would exceed the amount 
the right-holder could expect to collect. Collective administration of copyright addresses the 
problem by spreading the costs over a great many works.  
Under collective management, individual right-holders assign their right(s) to an 
organization which carries out the following tasks on their behalf: it monitors the use of works 
in its repertory and takes legal action against those who infringe copyright in these works; it 
negotiates fees with users and collects payments; it distributes payments to its members after 
deduction of overhead.57  
The oldest and largest collectives manage public performance rights for music in a 
repertoire that contains millions of works. These license music users such as broadcasters, 
                                                 
56 See Walsh, Arora and Cohen (2002) 
57 Members repossess their rights when they leave the society. 
 23
restaurants, concert halls and sports arenas.58 The typical license granted by a performing 
rights society is a blanket license.  It gives the licensee the right to unlimited use of all the 
works in the repertoire managed by the collective for a period of one year. Typically, the 
licensing fee correlates with the scale of users’ operations and the importance of music to 
their activities.59 The amounts that are redistributed by the collective to its members depend 
on the amount of use of their music, and on whether that music played a central or ancillary 
role for the purposes it was used.      
By tradition collectives are active only in the territory of the country where they are 
located. However, within that territory they administer a worldwide repertoire made up of 
works entrusted to them by local authors, and works assigned to them under reciprocal 
representation agreements with foreign collectives. This arrangement allows local users to 
obtain via the collective in their national territory unlimited access to a (virtual) worldwide 
repertory of copyrighted music. Such a right is important to music users who need unlimited 
and unplanned access to a large repertory. The blanket license offers such users the guarantee 
that any music performed in public will not infringe copyright.60    
In almost all countries a single society manages the performing rights. Users who need 
spur-of-the-moment access to a very large repertoire, cannot circumvent the national society 
when it holds the exclusive license to manage the performing rights in all present and future 
works of its members, and  when a substantial portion of authors who produce the type of 
work required by the user are members. As a rule, performing right societies are assigned 
exclusive rights by their members.61  
The role of collectives in copyright management has been expanding. Collectives are 
active in areas such as synchronization, reproduction, ‘droit de suite’, neighbouring rights and 
                                                 
58 The right to perform a work of music in public is one among several exclusive rights that copyright law grants 
composers.  
59 The tariff base often equals the revenues earned by the user during a representative period; the tariff rate is 
lower for sports arenas where music plays a lesser role than for concert halls where its role is central.  
60 Although public performance often requires that complementary rights be cleared, collectives rarely provide 
users a one-stop-shop. For example, a broadcaster may have to copy songs on hard disk in order to perform them 
in public. This means that the right to reproduce the work must also be cleared. For such a user a collective 
becomes a one-stop-shop only if it administers the public performing right, the reproduction right, and the 
remaining copyrights and neighbouring rights that must be cleared to perform the music. 
61 The most notable exception to this arrangement is found in the United States where the two main societies -
ASCAP (www.ascap.com) and BMI (www.bmi.com)- are bound under the terms of consent agreements to 
accept only non-exclusive licenses. 
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public lending.62 More often than not, one society is responsible for the collective 
administration of a specific right for a particular class of works.63  
This section will deal almost exclusively with performing rights societies in music 
because they are the oldest societies and they have been the subject of most antitrust scrutiny.  
 
3.1 Competition issues 
 
The forms of conduct that have come under scrutiny on both sides of the Atlantic are 
usefully grouped under the following headings: actions that strengthen the collectives’ 
capacity to exploit existing market power vis-à-vis users, and actions designed to favour some 
members at the expense of other members.64 
 
Blanket licenses versus limited repertory licensing 
 
The question whether collectives abuse their position of dominance when they refuse to grant 
licenses for a portion of their repertory was addressed by the European Court of Justice in the 
Tournier Judgment. Years before, the claimants - a group of discotheque owners - had 
initiated a case before the French competition authority, arguing that the SACEM – the 
French performing rights society - was acting abusively by refusing them licenses limited to 
popular dance music of predominantly Anglo-American origin. The claimants argued that 
they should not have to pay for the rights in other works that they would never use. They had 
already been refused licenses for such music by the foreign collectives. 
The ECJ (referred to by a French court for a preliminary ruling) held that “the refusal 
by a national society for the management of copyright in musical works to grant the users of 
recorded music access only to the foreign repertoire represented by it does not have the object 
of restricting competition in the common market unless access to part of the protected 
repertoire could entirely safeguard the interest of the authors, composers and publishers of 
music without thereby increasing the costs of managing contracts and monitoring the use of 
protected musical works”.65 The apparent implication is that a refusal to issue only blanket 
licenses would be illegal if collectives could somehow fully uphold authors’ interests without 
incurring cost increases.    
                                                 
62 A review of various types of collective administration can be found in WIPO (1990) and Gervais (2001). 
63 For example, there may be two societies that manage reproduction where one will deal with the reproduction 
of musical works while the other specializes in the reproduction of literary works. 
64 To address the concerns of monopoly power, some countries, including the UK and Canada, have adopted 
systems of compulsory licenses or regulation of tariffs by specialized administrative tribunals. Other countries 
rely primarily on the enforcement of competition law.  
65 Ministère Public versus Jean-Louis Tournier, case 395/87, 13 July 1989.  
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The economic rationale behind a demand for partial repertory licenses is not clear. The 
royalties paid to collectives do - in principle at least - reflect the value of the music to users. 
The mere fact that an individual uses a small subset of a repertoire does not imply that the 
music he uses is less valuable to him. To some users (e.g. discotheques) the music is vital. 
One must assume that the demands for limited repertory licenses derive from a belief that 
some regulatory authority would enforce a form of price control under which the royalty for a 
limited repertory license would relate to the royalty charged for a blanket license in a way that 
reflects the difference in the number of works cleared. 
Also, there is little doubt that making limited repertory licensing available is costly.  
While the costs of dividing the repertoire are not likely to be significant, there is a possibility 
that litigation cost will be incurred when users and societies disagree how particular songs 
should be classified.66 Also, because a substantial portion of a collective’s repertory consists 
of new songs, users who acquire a limited license would have to verify on a continuous basis 
whether new releases they want to play are in fact covered by their license. In addition, 
monitoring costs are higher because societies want to insure that users do not perform works 
for which they have not cleared the rights.67  
Because of the extra cost associated with fractional licensing, and because the product 
being licensed is a public good, it is likely that the parties would settle on a blanket license 
even if the collective was bound to issue a limited repertory license on demand.  
 
The assignment of rights to collectives  
The questions  raised by competition authorities concerning collective societies are: 
1. Does a society act abusively when it accepts to administer a specific right only on 
condition that the right holder hand over other rights pertaining to the same works? 
2. Does a society lessen competition unduly when it declines to administer a specific 
right on behalf of a person who refuses to assign that right in respect to all possible uses or 
users of a work?  
3. Does a collective abuse its position of dominance when it demands that rights be 
assigned in a form that rules out direct and independent licensing by members with respect to 
the same rights? 
4. Does a society unduly restrict competition when it accepts members on condition 
that the rights they assign embrace all the works in which they hold such rights?   
                                                 
66 In this regard see Broadcast Music Moor –Law Inc. Civ. A 77-325  
67Note, however, that price discrimination does not require the division of the repertoire in sub-categories. 
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The following principles were laid down by the European Commission in the GEMA 
decision:68 members of collectives must have the right to choose which rights, among a 
number of rights or utilisation categories established by the Commission, they wish to exploit 
through the collective; a collective may demand that a member assign a specific right to all 
works within the categories that it administers.69  
The Commission considered the issue of partial assignment again when two members 
of Daft Punk (a French techno-music group) applied for membership in SACEM in respect of 
all their rights except two categories identified in the GEMA decision. They were advised by 
the French society that membership would be denied unless they showed that another society 
had been appointed in respect of the excluded rights. In response to a finding by the 
Commission that such a requirement was abusive of SACEM’s dominant position, the French 
society amended the internal regulation that barred membership of authors who reside in the 
European Union and do not assign all rights to it or another society. Under the amended rule, 
SACEM may derogate from this regulation and accept the author. The decision to do so must 
be well-founded. This was accepted by the Commission, which stressed that refusals to 
derogate would have to be exceptional and based on objective reasons.70   
Neither the GEMA nor the SACEM decision disputed the legality of a collective’s 
demand that a right assigned be exclusive. It is significant therefore that some jurisdictions 
have expanded the list of situations in which members can withdraw from collective 
management. In Ireland and the UK, performing right societies are required to allow members 
to divide the performing right into categories and decide which of the categories they entrust 
to the collective administration system. Upon request from a member, the local societies are 
duty-bound to license back, on a non-exclusive basis, all or part of the performing right in 
members’ works performed in live concerts - the so-called “live event right” - by the 
members. This arrangement allows members to negotiate a performance royalty at the time 
they settle on other contractual terms with promoters of concerts or owners of venues. The 
reason given by the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission for recommending that 
members be entitled to administer their own live performances rights is that the circumstances 
in which this would occur would be tightly and clearly defined, and that live performances, 
such as major tours, were in many respects similar to performances of operas and ballets 
                                                 
68 GEMA (Geselschaft für Musikalische Auffuerungs und Mechanische Verfielfaetigungsrechte) is the German 
performing rights society.  
69 GEMA, EC Official J. L134. June 20, 1971 and GEMAII EC Official J. L 166, July 24, 1972  
70 Wood (2001) and Bulletin EU 7/8-2002 Competition (24/40). 
 27
which are classified as grand rights where the articles of association permit direct agreement 
between their copyright holder and the organizer of the performance.71 
 
Rivalry among collectives 
 
As indicated above, the licenses granted by societies allow for the public performance of 
music within the national boundaries of the territory in which these societies operate. The 
main justification for such territorial limitation is the need for a local presence to monitor the 
uses of works entrusted to the collective. Such presence is not necessary for on-line 
distribution because specialized software allows monitoring at a distance of all the music 
delivered via a particular server. This makes worldwide management via a single organization 
possible. For that reason it holds the promise of significant cost savings. It also removes a key 
justification for societies not to compete in the cross-border provision of services. To enhance 
the management efficiency of the rights in music delivered via the Internet, a number of 
societies established in different national territories have entered into agreements that allow 
users such as broadcasters to clear rights for many national territories via a single 
organization.  
The Commission has recently handed down an important ruling in regard to 
agreements that cover the rights of performers in music distributed concurrently by broadcast 
and on the Internet. This form of distribution is called simulcasting. 72 The competition issues 
raised by simulcasting were brought to the Commission’s attention by an application for a 
negative clearance for an agreement among 29 European and other societies. The agreement 
allowed music users to clear rights for multiple territories and/or pay equitable remuneration 
via a single party.73 
Under the original agreement a collective could grant a multi-territorial license only to 
simulcasters whose signals originated in its national territory.74 The licensing fee would have 
been equal to the sum of the individual tariffs set by each society for simulcasting on its own 
territory.75 Because of concerns expressed by the Commission, the agreement was amended to 
                                                 
71 See MMC (1996). The UK society had argued unsuccessfully before the competition authority that the 
absence of mention of “live event rights” in the lists provided by the European Commission implied that it was 
not compelled to issue licenses for such uses.  
72 Case COMP/C2/38.014 IFPI Simulcasting, decision of 8 October 2002, OJ L107 (30.04.2003) p. 58. Another 
(Santiago Agreement) deals with performance licensing when no simulcasting is involved; see press release 
IP/04/586. A third agreement (Barcelona Agreement) deals with reproduction rights. 
73 Clearance was sought by the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI). 
74 Under an earlier version of the agreement notified on 16/11/2000 a collecting society was empowered to grant 
a license only to simulcasters whose signals originated in the country traditionally served by that collective.   
75 The latter could be based on a percentage of the revenue generated from the simulcast within its territory. 
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allow any party that had entered the agreement and was established in the EEA to grant a 
multi-territorial simulcasting license to any broadcaster whose signals originated in the EEA.   
This amendment opened a door to some competition among the EEA-based collectives 
that were party to the agreement. However, price competition remained limited because 
aggregation of national tariffs meant that all participating societies would grant one and the 
same product at an identical price. The only price-related competition that could possibly 
benefit users related to such factors as conditions of payment and rebates.   
The Commission opined that this limited price competition was too feeble to benefit 
small or medium scale users. It reasoned that the amalgamation of the royalty and the 
administrative fee in a single amount, as provided under the original and amended 
agreements, was not necessary to the existence of an agreement and that it “prevents 
prospective users from assessing the efficiency of each one of the participating societies and 
from benefiting from the licensing services from the society capable of providing them at a 
lower cost.”76 The Commission held that competition would be enhanced if the aggregate 
payments were broken up into separate components: a copyright royalty and an administration 
fee.  
In response to this concern, IFPI submitted a second amendment that provided a 
mechanism under which collecting societies in the EEA would specify which part of their 
tariff corresponds to the administration fee charged to the user. This part would be determined 
with reference to actual administration cost of the individual grantor society. 
With such a split in place, the Commission no longer opposed the principle of a 
common royalty determined by aggregation of the tariffs established by the individual 
societies. It defended this stance by arguing that this arrangement is the “least restrictive of 
the alternatives in the present circumstances so as to create and distribute a new product”. It 
also held that in the absence of a “minimum degree of control over licensing terms” societies 
could earn revenue lower than by not participating in an agreement necessary to provide a 
new product to users”. If so, their incentive to participate would disappear.77 The 
Commission’s decision was also motivated by the fact that the form of co-operation between 
societies required under the agreement did not take the place of existing competition. 
  
3.2 Opening up of alternative options.  
 
                                                 
76 Commission decision (08.10.2002) relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 
of the EEA Agreement, Case No. COMP/C2/38.014-IFP “Simulcasting”.  
77 Ibid. para. 111-113. 
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The effects the amendments will have on welfare will depend on the following: Will they 
allow new actors to license the right managed by the collective? If so, will the presence of 
such actors add significantly to competitive pressure? The options that matter from a 
competition perspective are primarily those that allow right holders and users to bypass the 
collective.   
Consider first the option of non-exclusive licenses. Such an option removes the 
contractual impediment to direct negotiation between music users and right holders or their 
representatives, in regard to rights managed by collectives. To exert competitive pressure, the 
option must be credible, i.e. it must be attractive to some users and to the owners of the music 
they wish to perform. Direct licensing of the right may be appealing to a user who has no need 
for unlimited and unplanned access to a large repertoire of copyrighted works. It may also 
draw users who require such access for a segment of their activities if they can acquire a mini 
blanket license for that segment at a price sufficiently lower than the standard blanket 
licence.78  
Transaction costs are also increased by mandating the option. A major component of 
transaction costs is the cost of monitoring music users who do not hold a blanket license. 
Another increase may be due to the cost of negotiating terms of the performing license. 
However, the latter is likely to be less when the user commissions new music than when he 
seeks to acquire the performing right for an existing work since when the user commissions 
work from a supplier, the parties are already engaged in dialogue.  
 
The mere opening of additional licensing avenues does not guarantee that the price of 
performing music will go down. The performing right is only one component of the cost of 
performing music. Blanket licensing rules out price competition for the performance of 
components of the repertoire. It does not, however, preclude efforts by right holders to bring 
price strategies into play in order to stimulate the demand for their music. Some users - film 
makers for example - may have to acquire both a performing and a synchronization license. 
As long as the royalty paid to clear other rights pertaining to the same works are set 
individually, there remains competition for the works. The user of music is concerned about 
the sum of payments for all the rights he must clear. The decomposition of payments into 
performing royalties and other royalties hardly matters. As long as some important 
complementary rights are licensed individually, an increase in the price of the blanket 
                                                 
78 Such a user could be a broadcaster who uses only pre-recorded music. 
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performing license should be accompanied by some decrease in the price of the 
complementary licenses. 
A similar trade-off may exist in the supply of new works. Producers of TV or radio 
programmes who commission new music pay artists a creative fee. They are also concerned 
with the total cost of the music which includes the creative fee plus all payments to clear the 
rights for all intended uses. Because the creative fees are negotiated on an individual basis, a 
major component of the cost of music is determined in the market where competition is 
present.  
 The payment of a payola is also a form of price competition. A payola refers to 
payments made to persons in broadcasting to persuade them to give more play time to works 
in which the person making the payment has an interest. Payola exists because play time 
stimulates the sales of recordings. Some jurisdictions try to control the payment of a payola; 
for example, in the US it is illegal when non publicly disclosed.79 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has looked at three areas where the exercise of intellectual property rights 
granted appear to conflict with competition policy objectives. It has discussed major 
judgments handed down by the European courts that clarify how Articles 81 and 82 of the EC 
Treaty rein in rights to exclude granted under intellectual property laws.  
The analysis of parallel trade suggests that courts are more likely to strike down 
agreements to segment the EU into national markets than arrangements that serve to protect 
the EU market from imports originating from outside the Union. The Trade Marks Directive 
illustrates in the clearest possible fashion the paramountcy of creating a single market as 
policy objective of European competition policy. It is now established that unless explicit 
authorization to sell into the Union is granted, the holder of a European trade mark can block 
such imports. Also, private agreements that pursue this objective are not considered, by their 
very nature, to be anticompetitive. Further evidence of the weight assigned to creating a single 
market is provided by the Commission’s per se treatment of explicit private agreements to 
stop parallel trade among Member States.  
                                                 
79 Section 507 of the Communications Act, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 508 requires that when anyone pays 
someone to include program matter in a broadcast, the fact of payment must be disclosed in advance of the 
broadcast to the station over which the mater is to be carried. Both the person making the payment and the 
recipient are obligated to disclose the payment so that the station may make the sponsorship identification 
announcement required by Section 317 of the Act. Failure to disclose such payments is punishable by a fine of 
not more than $11,000 or imprisonment for not more than one year or both. See www.fcc.gov/eb/broadcast 
 31
Such harsh treatment of segmentation is difficult to justify on purely economic 
grounds. An interesting question, therefore, is whether competition authorities will continue 
to deal in this way with agreements or unilateral conduct that partition the EU into territories. 
The courts may well face this issue in the near future because existence of a significant gap in 
purchasing power between old and new Member States raises the benefits from geographical 
segmentation.  
The judgements that address refusals to license know-how, or products protected by 
patents and copyright, do not provide as lucid a picture of the conditions under which a right 
holder will be compelled to issue a license. It is clear that competition objectives do limit the 
scope of the right to exclude granted by intellectual property laws, but the circumstances 
when they do appear to be largely case-specific. The conditions of the much cited Magill 
decision have been termed exceptional. The Oscar Bronner judgment which stresses that the 
cost of developing the essential input is crucial appears well-founded economically. However, 
its impact on future rulings remains uncertain.  
Copyright collectives have always raised challenging questions from an antitrust 
perspective. Blanket licensing and requirements that authors assign all rights or none to the 
collective certainly appear to have anti-competitive potential. Also, the organization of 
markets in which collectives operate gives collectives a position of dominance. Yet, because 
of the specificities of the markets in which these societies operate, they have been allowed to 
engage in conduct that would otherwise run afoul of competition rules. European courts have 
rightly been concerned that mandating alternative contractual arrangements between on one 
hand, collectives and users, and on the other hand, collective organizations and their 
members, would undermine the capacity of authors to exercise rights granted to them by law. 
It appears that national authorities rather than European authorities have currently gone 
furthest in experimenting with some alternative arrangements.  
The trade-off between the desire to promote the emergence of new products and the 
desire to promote competition comes across very clearly in the process that led to adoption of 
the final version of the Simulcast agreement. The Commission finally settled for a formula 
that rules out price competition for the product itself but gives parties to the agreement an 
incentive to minimize overall charges.  
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